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This article offers a new theoretical explanation of the relationship between religion and the 
demand for redistribution. Previous literature shows that religious individuals are less likely 
to favor redistribution either because (a) religion provides a substitute for state welfare 
provision or (b) it adds a salient moral dimension to an individual’s calculus which induces 
them to act contrary to their economic interests. In this article, the author argues that the effect 
of religion on an individual’s redistributive preferences is best explained by their partisanship, 
via a process of partisan motivated reasoning. In contexts where parties are able to combine 
religion with pro-redistribution policies, religious individuals are more likely to favour 
redistribution as doing so reinforces partisan identity. In advanced democracies, religious 
individuals are more likely to be supporters of centre-right parties which oppose 
redistribution. However, in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) the historical and political 
context leads to the opposite expectation. The nature of party competition in CEE has seen 
nationalist populist parties adopt policy platforms that combine religion and leftist economic 
programmes. They are able to credibly combine these two positions due to the way in which 
religion and the welfare state became linked to conceptions of the nation during the inter-war 
state-building years. Using data from 2002-2014, the author shows that religiosity is associated 
with pro-redistribution attitudes in CEE. Furthermore, religious supporters of nationalist 
populist parties are more likely to favor redistribution than religious supporters of other 
parties. The results of this research add greater nuance to our understanding of the 
relationship between religiosity and economic preferences. 
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Introduction 
 
Religion is a key determinant of attitudes towards redistribution. In their seminal article, 
Scheve and Stasavage (2006) found that religious individuals are less likely to support 
redistribution. They argue that for religious individuals, the church provides psychological 
benefits that are a substitute for social insurance derived from the state. De La O and Rodden 
(2008) offer an alternative explanation, suggesting that religiosity increases the salience of a 
moral values dimension which draws low income voters into coalitions with the upper and 
middle classes. This leads low income voters to prefer economic policies which are contrary 
to their self-interest. Irrespective of the theoretical perspective adopted, the inverse 
relationship between religiosity and preferences for redistribution has been replicated 
numerous times and remains consistent across denominations (Jordan, 2014; Stegmueller et 
al., 2012). 
 
In this article, I set out an alternative explanation of the relationship between religion and 
preferences for redistribution which can lead to results that are contrary to the findings of 
previous research. I argue that the partisanship of religious individuals provides a more 
generalizable explanation for their redistributive preferences. This is due to individuals 
engaging in partisan motivated reasoning, whereby they process information in a way that 
allows them to defend and maintain their partisan identity (Leeper and Slothuus, 2014; 
Kunda, 1990; Petersen et al., 2013; Taber and Lodge, 2006). Existing research on religion and 
redistributive preferences is largely based on samples of advanced democracies. These 
countries generally have conventional patterns of party competition in which the left is 
associated with redistributive politics, secularity, and liberal values and the right are 
associated more with greater emphasis on self-reliance, religiosity, and traditional values. As 
religious individuals are more likely to support parties of the right in advanced democracies 
(Arzheimer and Carter, 2009), their opposition to redistribution aligns with their partisan 
affiliation. In the newer democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), this is not 
necessarily the case. In CEE, parties of the nationalist populist right adopt positions that 
emphasize both religiosity and left-wing economic policies. As a result, I argue that due to 
individuals engaging in partisan motivated reasoning, religiosity has the opposite effect in 
CEE and will be associated with support for greater redistribution. 
 
However, research has shown that partisanship does not always trump information when 
individuals evaluate an issue (Bullock, 2011; Mullinix, 2016; Slothuus, 2010). Right-wing 
nationalist parties therefore need to be able to credibly adopt left-wing positions so that 
individuals can reasonably defend their partisan identities. In CEE, I show that nationalist 
populist parties can do this for two reasons: first, the dimensionality of party competition in 
CEE fundamentally differs from that observed in Western Europe. Second, in CEE, both the 
welfare state and religion were used to build support for the post-imperial nation-states 
during the inter-war years. This led to a fusion of national identity with religious identity as 
well as equating the welfare state with the nation-state (Aidukaite, 2009; Grzymala-Busse, 
2015; Inglot, 2008). Nationalist populist parties can draw on this conception of nationalism to 
credibly adopt left-wing stances on economic matters. Religious individuals can therefore 
incorporate support for redistribution into their partisan identities. 
 
I test this argument using data from seven waves of the European Social Survey over the 
period 2002 to 2014. The results confirm that religious individuals are more likely to favor 
redistribution in CEE. Furthermore, the relationship between religiosity and pro-
redistribution preferences is conditional on party identification: religious supporters of 
nationalist populist parties are more likely to favor redistribution. The results of this research 
indicate that the construction of partisan identities can condition the influence that religion 
has on individual-level preferences for redistribution. This research therefore contributes a 
more nuanced understanding of the relationship between religion and redistribution which, 
while focused on new democracies, also has implications for our understanding of this 
relationship in advanced democracies. 
 
Religion and redistribution 
 
Religious institutions have been a crucial part of the development of welfare states in 
advanced democracies though the scope and direction of their influence is a matter for debate 
(Manow and van Kersbergen, 2009). One may expect that religiosity encourages altruism and 
support for welfare states that assist those in need, though not necessarily in a redistributive 
manner. This is supported by Catholic social doctrine and the role of the Catholic Church in 
the development of Christian democratic welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Kahl, 2005). 
While this led to larger welfare states in countries influenced by Christian democracy, the guiding 
principals have been based around self-insured social protection and status preservation rather 
than redistribution, which was considered too disruptive to society (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 
Pontusson & Rueda, 2010; van Kersbergen & Hemerijck, 2004). Research has shown that welfare 
spending is high under Christian democratic governments, but the distributive profile of taxes and 
transfers offsets that spending, so redistribution is low (Bradley, Huber, Moller, Nielsen, & 
Stephens, 2003). Furthermore, analysis of manifesto data shows that Christian democratic parties 
hold similar positions on welfare and economic policies as conservative parties (Rommel & Walter, 
2018). Consequently, even where Christian democracy increases support for social insurance in 
Western Europe, it is less likely to engender support for redistribution. Similarly, some creeds, 
such as Protestantism, emphasize self-reliance and may be expected to result in preferences 
for less redistribution (Jordan, 2014; Manow and van Kersbergen, 2009). 
 
Denominational differences are largely irrelevant in the seminal theories of religion and 
redistributive preferences which instead emphasize differences between religious and 
secular individuals. Scheve and Stasavage (2006) set out a model in which religion acts as a 
substitute for social insurance. They argue that religion provides psychological benefits that 
help individuals to cope with adverse life events. This makes religious individuals less reliant 
on the state when faced with economic hardship. Scheve and Stasavage further assert that 
those on lower incomes are likely to derive equal, if not greater, psychological benefits from 
religion and will therefore oppose state-led redistribution even though it is in their economic 
interests. Their results show that frequent attendance at religious services accounts for 
around 25 percent of the standard deviation of support for social spending, a result similar in 
magnitude to the effect of an individual being unemployed. De La O and Rodden (2008) agree 
that religiosity is likely to lead to lower support for redistribution but propose an alternative 
explanation. They argue that religion acts as a distraction to voters. In political systems where 
there is a salient moral dimension that structures voters’ preferences alongside an economic 
dimension, the moral dimension induces conservative religious voters to prefer policies that 
may be contrary to their economic self-interest. Empirical testing confirms the predictions of 
both theories: religious individuals are less likely to favor redistribution than secular 
individuals. For example, using the same data and methods as those used in this article, Rueda 
(2018) found that non-religious individuals have 6 percent greater odds of preferring 
redistribution than religious individuals. Further research by Stegmueller at al. (2012) and 
Jordan (2014) has shown that these findings apply to both Catholics and Protestants. 
Stegmueller et al. conclude that “[t]he cleavage between religious and secular individuals is 
far more important than the difference between denominations.”1  
 
However, research shows that religion can have a variable effect on redistributive 
preferences, particularly in the US. McCarthy et al. (2016) found that identification with the 
“religious right” reduced support for tax increases on the rich but individuals who believe that 
Jesus promoted a just society, and Black protestants, were more likely to favour tax increases. 
Similar to previous research, Thomson and Froese (2018) have shown that individuals who 
attend religious services more frequently have 26 percent lower odds of supporting 
redistribution than those that do not attend services. But their results also show that 
individuals who identify as Republicans and believe that God is engaged in the world are 
more likely to support redistribution. In a broader comparative study, Gaskins et al. (2013) 
found that the relationship between religion and attitudes towards inequality is conditional. 
Poorer individuals who are religious are more likely to be economically conservative but 
religious participation decreases economic conservatism among the rich. These studies 
indicate that the general effect of religiosity on economic preferences in established 
democracies conforms to the expectations set out by Scheve and Stasavage (2006) and Del La 
O and Rodden (2008), but there may be heterogeneous effects that see the relationship 
reversed. 
 
While the evidence concerning religion and redistribution is largely consistent, it is based on 
samples of advanced democracies. It is therefore questionable just how far these studies are 
generalizable. Could we expect to find a different relationship between religiosity and 
redistribution in countries where the political and economic context is distinct? There is 
currently no research that specifically addresses the influence of religion on redistributive 
preferences in new democracies – although Gaskins et al. (2013) include new democracies in 
their pooled sample, they do not consider how their results may vary in these countries.2  
 
Few authors have sought to examine the impact that the distinct political development of CEE 
states has had on redistributive attitudes though some have shown that individuals in the 
region are more likely to support redistribution compared to those in Western Europe 
(Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Corneo and Gruner, 2002; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2017). 
Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017) ascribe this to the influence of the communist legacy on 
political preferences, though it should be noted that they explicitly state that they are 
assessing attitudes towards the welfare state rather than redistribution, which also entails 
other policies, such as taxation. They also examine how communist socialization interacts 
with religion, finding that the communist legacy had no effect on the welfare spending 
preferences of regular churchgoers compared to non-churchgoers (Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 
2017). There is then, reason to believe that the welfare preferences of practicing religious 
individuals are not influenced by the communist legacy. It is my contention that rather than 
looking to the communist legacy for an explanation of redistributive attitudes, we should 
instead consider other distinctive features of CEE countries. 
 
One such feature is the nature of party competition in new democracies. In established 
democracies, parties of the left are the standard-bearers of pro-redistribution policies and are 
also more likely to have a secular outlook (Rueda, 2018; Savage, 2019). By contrast, parties of 
the mainstream right are associated with less state intervention and usually place greater 
emphasis on religion in public life. At the individual level, research has shown that both 
religiosity and support for more right-wing parties are associated with opposition to 
redistribution (Scheve and Stasavage, 2006). But could we still expect religious individuals to 
oppose redistribution in contexts where right-wing parties can credibly adopt pro-
redistribution policy platforms? In the next section, I argue that when right-wing parties that 
appeal to religious voters can credibly adopt leftist economic positions, religious individuals 




Partisanship, religion, and redistribution 
 
The influence of partisanship on public opinion has a rich history beginning with The 
American Voter in which the authors described parties as opinion-forming agencies (Campbell 
et al., 1960). Since then, partisanship has often been characterized as a perceptual screen 
through which individuals filter politically-relevant information (Kam, 2005; Lau and 
Redlawsk, 2001). But how does an individual’s partisanship affect preference formation? Over 
the last 15 years or so, a growing body of research has indicated that the effect of partisanship 
can be explained by motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990). Individuals are motivated by two 
types of goal when attempting to process information: accuracy and directional goals. 
Accuracy goals refer to an individual’s desire to evaluate information in a way that leads to 
the formation of a “correct” opinion. Directional goals describe an individual’s motivation to 
arrive at a particular conclusion that conforms with prior attitudes or beliefs via processes of 
confirmation or disconfirmation bias (Taber and Lodge, 2006). Maintaining and defending 
one’s partisan identity is an example of a directional goal which has been termed partisan 
motivated reasoning (Leeper and Slothuus, 2014). Individuals that engage in partisan 
motivated reasoning attempt to process information in a way that is consistent with, and 
helps to preserve, their partisan identity. Previous research has shown that partisan 
motivated reasoning can affect an individual’s evaluations of politicians (Goren, 2002), 
perceptions of public support or opposition to a given policy or issue (Nir, 2011), and how 
policy outcomes are evaluated by individuals (McCabe, 2016). Crucially, partisan motivated 
reasoning has also been shown to influence an individual’s attitudes and policy preferences. 
Studies demonstrate that individuals are more likely to adopt a policy if it has been endorsed 
by their chosen party (Bolsen et al., 2014; Druckman et al., 2013; Slothuus, 2010) and will 
expend greater effort to process information in order to defend a position that has been 
endorsed by their party either by attempting to confirm their position or to discredit 
opposing evidence (Petersen et al., 2013; Taber and Lodge, 2006). 
 
However, individuals do not unthinkingly adopt a party’s policy positions all the time. Bullock 
(2011) has shown that information about policies can affect an individual’s attitudes as much 
as partisanship. Prior beliefs and or attitudes can also be more powerful influences on an 
individual’s decision-making than partisanship. Using a natural experiment, Slothuus (2010) 
found that when the Danish Social Democrats announced a major policy shift on early 
retirement benefits, party identifiers were more likely to shift their positions on the issue. But 
this effect was only present among those identifiers that share the prior belief that the 
welfare system was under stress (Slothuus, 2010). Similarly, Mullinix (2016) demonstrates 
that when parties take non-traditional positions on an issue, thus resulting in partisan 
motivated reasoning and issue motivated reasoning pulling in opposite directions, individuals 
can be more likely to engage in issue-motivated reasoning if the policy at hand is salient to 
them personally or if elites are not polarized on the issue (Mullinix, 2016). 
 
If right-wing parties adopt interventionist positions on the economy they are also adopting 
non-traditional issue positions and therefore, party identifiers need a strong reason to adjust 
their own positions. For religious identifiers of right-wing parties, this requirement increases 
as we know from previous research that religion is strongly associated with right-wing 
economic attitudes (Scheve and Stasavage, 2006; Stegmueller et al., 2012). In CEE, there are 
two factors that allow certain right-wing parties to adopt credible left-wing positions on 
economic issues: first, the structure of party competition in CEE. Second, the importance of 
both religion and the welfare state to conceptions of nationalism in the region. 
 
Redistribution and party competition in CEE 
 
 
Right-wing, nationalist populist parties are a common feature of the political landscape in 
CEE. They are distinguished from extreme nationalist parties by their less virulent nationalist 
rhetoric and their greater concern with issues that appeal to non-nationalist groups. For 
extreme nationalists, matters of race and ethnicity are primary (Pop-Eleches, 2010). For these 
reasons, nationalist populists are legitimate contenders for government in CEE whereas 
extreme nationalists are marginal players.3 Despite being labelled right-wing, these parties 
often adopt left-wing economic policies. As a result, the structure of party competition in CEE 
differs from that found in Western Europe (Savage, 2016). In both regions, the two-
dimensional space of competition can be conceptualized using an economic left-right 
dimension and a values dimension that runs from traditional to liberal values (Marks, 
Hooghe, Nelson, & Edwards, 2007). However, the positions of certain party families within 
that space varies between East and West. Specifically, those parties that Marks et al. describe 
as “radical TAN”4 combine right-wing economic profiles with traditional values in the West. 
But in CEE, these parties hold leftist economic platforms along with traditional values (Marks 
et al., 2007; Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2012). Recent research has shown that right-wing 
populist parties in Western Europe have become more pro-welfare over time as their 
electorate has become more working class, though the salience of redistributive policy to 
their platforms remains a matter of debate (Afonso & Rennwald, 2018). Some authors argue 
that economic policy is of secondary importance compared to immigration and nativism to 
such parties and that they deliberately blur their economic positions (Mudde, 2007; Rovny, 
2013). Individual-level studies also show that supporters of right-wing populist parties still 
tend to oppose redistribution in Western Europe (Rueda 2018; Zhirkov 2014). 
 
Competing explanations have been offered for the phenomenon of right-wing parties 
subscribing to leftist economic policies in CEE. For some, it is a legacy of communism. 
Communism, it is argued, was an economically left-wing but socially authoritarian experience, 
improving distributive outcomes but repressing dissent and self-expression. Democratic and 
market reform increased economic inequality as well as political inclusion but also created 
groups that did not benefit from the transformation. For parties appealing to the “losers of 
democratization”, left-wing and traditionalist platforms are seen as the polar opposite of the 
new democratic order (Kitschelt, 1992; Marks et al., 2007). However, Marks et al. only 
present evidence from parties’ positions in the ideological space. When their argument has 
been tested at the individual-level, there is limited support for the notion that right-wing 
populists appeal to the losers of transition. Many of the transitional losers identified by Marks 
et al. – the elderly, poorly educated, and unemployed – are not more likely to support right-
wing populists in CEE (Allen, 2017; Stanley, 2011). 
 
Alternatively, Tavits and Letki (2009) argue that right-wing populist parties adopted leftist 
economic policies opportunistically. Left-wing parties were better placed to implement the 
fiscal austerity policies required during the economic reform process. This was due to the 
stronger organizational bases that left-wing parties possessed combined with their stable and 
more loyal electorate. Consequently, while governing left-wing parties reduced public 
expenditure, right-wing parties had both the opportunity and incentive to appeal to voters 
suffering economic hardship by advocating redistributive policies (Tavits and Letki, 2009). 
While this argument is plausible and contributed to the decline of social democratic parties in 
CEE, previous research also shows that voters do not necessarily respond to such changes in 
policy position by parties particularly if the issue is salient to individuals or the party is 
adopting a non-traditional position on a policy (Mullinix, 2016; Slothuus, 2010). 
 
An alternative explanation lies in the way in which nationalist populist parties can fuse 
religion and redistribution in CEE. Since the fall of communism, nationalist populist parties 
have used religion as part of their rhetorical appeal. Buzalka (2008) has identified three 
features that link religion with populism in CEE: “the pre-eminence and defence of the 
patriarchal family and a rigid moral order, the complicated obsession with the nation, and 
beliefs about the role of ‘the people’ and their traditions.” For some parties, such as Law and 
Justice in Poland, this has been crucial to their electoral success (Stanley, 2016). In the case of 
Fidesz, one of the most successful right-wing populist parties in CEE, religion has not been 
prominent in the party’s manifestos, but since 20006, leader Viktor Orban has repeatedly 
used references to Christianity in his rhetoric to justify opposition to immigration from 
mainly Muslim countries. Furthermore, the Hungarian Fundamental Law passed by the Fidesz 
government in 2011 pointedly refers to Hungary as a country based on Christian values 
(Ádám and Bozóki, 2016).  
 
This emphasis on religion has been combined with an economic platform that is more 
redistributive. In part, this is an appeal to individuals who subjectively see themselves as 
losers of transition, such as those who are aggrieved by the progress made by minority 
groups in society (Bustikova, 2014). However, welfare policy is also a way for parties to 
reinforce traditional values which have been perceived to be threatened by democratic and 
economic liberalization. Some nationalist populist parties have used welfare policy as a way 
of re-establishing traditional family roles which had been transformed under communism. 
Gender equality was notionally part of the communist project and women were encouraged 
to be economically active during this period. In the postcommunist era, nationalists, 
supported by churches, sought to reverse this trend and persuade women to adopt a 
traditional role in the household (Pascall and Manning, 2000; Szikra, 2014). Family policy 
became a way to do this with improved maternity leave and family benefits. And in the case of 
Poland, the government adopted the ’Family 500+’ policy which pays families a generous 
monthly benefit for second and all subsequent children (Financial Times, 2016). 
 
In turn, voters have responded to the religious and redistributive appeals of right-wing 
populists. In CEE, it has been shown that the voters of right-wing populist parties are more 
likely to be both religious and supporters or redistribution (Allen, 2017). In Western Europe 
religious individuals are already committed to established Conservative and Christian 
Democratic parties that oppose redistribution, and despite the movement of such parties to 
more pro-welfare positions (Afonso and Rennwald, 2018), they have not gravitated towards 
the populist right as they have in CEE (Arzheimer and Carter, 2009; Rueda, 2018). It is 
therefore likely that religious individuals in Western Europe that engage in partisan 
motivated reasoning will adopt the right-wing economic positions of Conservative and 
Christian Democratic parties. But how can nationalist populists in CEE credibly combine 





Religion, the welfare state, and the nation state 
 
The inter-war period had a significant influence on how national identity came to be defined 
in CEE. During this period, CEE states began the processes of consolidation of the nation state 
and welfare state expansion. It is during this time that national identity became imbued with 
religion and support for the welfare state initially became part of nationalist discourse 
(Cerami and Stanescu, 2009; Inglot, 2008). Governments in CEE used religion to bolster their 
state-building projects which resulted in a fusion of religious identity and national identity 
(Grzymala-Busse, 2015; Tomka, 1998). This usually privileged one particular religious group 
such as Catholics in Lithuania and Poland and Orthodox and Greek Catholics in Romania (Stan 
and Turcescu, 2011). 
 
The association of national identity with religion and the welfare state persisted through, and 
was perhaps enhanced by, the communist period. Secularization was a strand of Marxism-
Leninism which argued that religion distracted the working class from their real interests. 
However, secularization was only partly successful in communist Europe; for example, the 
church remained strong in Poland throughout the communist period while in Romania the 
church persisted in part by allying itself with the nationalist communist regime (Stan and 
Turcescu, 2011). Churches also found ways to work with the state in most countries, 
particularly after the early years of communism in Eastern Europe. The communist 
commitment to comprehensive welfare coverage for those in need drew support from 
churches. For the regime, churches were used to try and quell opposition groups, for example, 
by acting as mediators between the state and opposition movements (Stan and Turcescu, 
2011). However, churches also represented a center of resistance to the regimes’ attempts to 
redefine national identity as class identity. churches came to be regarded as guardians of 
national identity and, as Grzymala-Busse (2015) puts it, “patriotism blurred with religious 
loyalty.” The result was a deepening of the fusion between religion and national identity that 
had begun during the inter-war period. 
 
The welfare state also became part of the state-building project in CEE during the inter-war 
period. Industrialization and modernization arrived later in CEE compared to Western 
Europe. 
 
During the inter-war years, CEE countries were still largely agrarian economies. 
Approximately 74 percent of workers were employed in agriculture in Poland in the early 
1920s as were 56 percent of Hungarian employees. The proportion employed in agriculture in 
Czechoslovakia at this time was lower at 42 percent but this was by some distance the largest 
single sector of the labor market (Inglot, 2008). 
 
Despite this low-level of industrialization, CEE countries had begun to establish welfare states 
(Szikra and Tomka, 2009). All states inherited limited systems of social insurance following 
the collapse of imperial rule in Europe. These were often restricted to pension provision for 
civil servants but they were soon expanded as the principles of Bismarckian welfare states 
were considered essential to the state-building projects of all countries in CEE (Aidukaite, 
2009; Cerami and Stanescu, 2009; Inglot, 2008). By the end of the 1920s, across the region, 
governments implemented or expanded policies of social insurance for sickness, injuries, and 
old age (Szikra and Tomka, 2009) though the scope of coverage provided by these schemes 
varied within and between countries (Inglot, 2008). Nevertheless, welfare states were 
essential tools of building support for nascent nation-states and along with religion, they were 
used by governments to create the sense of common-cause, culture, and solidarity between 
individuals that is required for consolidating a nation-state. 
 
The fusion of nationalism with religion, combined with the historical association of the 
welfare state with the nation state in CEE enables right-wing populist parties to credibly 
bundle together religion with a redistributive economic policy platform. The credibility of the 
nationalist populist’s left-wing economic platform means that religious supporters of such 
parties are likely to be influenced by partisan motivated reasoning as their partisan identities 
and issue preferences pull in the same direction (Mullinix, 2016). Furthermore, religious 
individuals in CEE are not challenged by automatic associations of redistributive policies with 
social democratic parties due to the distinct pattern of party competition in the region. As a 
result, religious individuals will hold more favorable preferences for redistribution in CEE. 
This is in contrast to the relationship observed in advanced democracies:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Individuals in CEE that are more religious will be more likely to support 
redistribution than secular individuals. 
 
It is also expected that supporters of nationalist populist parties will be more likely to favor 
redistribution as they align their policy positions with their partisan orientations. Combining 
this expectation with Hypothesis 1, religious supporters of nationalist populist parties will be 
more likely to favor redistribution than religious supporters of other parties in CEE. This 
leads to two additional hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Partisan supporters of nationalist populist parties will be more likely to favor 
redistribution than supporters of other parties. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Religious partisan supporters of nationalist populist parties will be more likely 
to favor redistribution than religious supporters of other parties. 
 
Data and methods 
 
I test these hypotheses using a pooled dataset of individual level attitudes in Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia. The data is taken 
from seven waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) which covers the period from 2002 to 
2014. The sample used in this research is comprised of approximately 52,000 individuals. As 
the context within which individuals live can influence their political preferences, I add 




The dependent variable in this research is a survey item which asks respondents the extent to 
which they agree with the following statement: “The government should take measures to 
reduce differences in income levels.” Respondents have five possible answers ranging from 1 
(Agree strongly) to 5 (Disagree strongly). This question and a similar question from the 
International Social Survey Programme are commonly-used to assess an individual’s 
redistributive preferences (e.g. Cusack et al., 2006; Finseraas, 2009; Rueda, 2018). I follow 
Rueda (2018) and recode this into a binary indicator which takes a value of 1 if a respondent 
agrees strongly or agrees with the statement and a value of 0 if they neither agree nor 
disagree, disagree, or disagree strongly. While this results in some loss of variance from the 
dependent variable, as Rueda (2018) argues, when support for redistribution is high as it is in 
CEE (see Figure 1), the neutral category can justifiably be interpreted as a less overt 
expression of opposition. In Table S6 of the supplementary material I replicate all models 
from Table 1 using the original 5-category dependent variable. The results remain 
substantively the same and do not change the conclusions of this paper. The distribution of 
responses to the question can be seen in Figure 1. A clear majority of respondents in all 
countries favor redistribution ranging from 61 percent in the Czech Republic to 90 percent in 
Lithuania. A high level of support for redistribution is not unusual though it is, on average, 
higher in CEE than in advanced democracies (Corneo and Gruner, 2002). 
 
 
Figure 1: Proportion who agree and strongly agree that the government should reduce 
differences in income. 
Independent variables 
 
The first independent variable measures the religiosity of respondents. In line with previous 
research in this field I define religious individuals as those for whom practicing religion is 
central to their life. This is manifest in their frequency of attendance at religious services 
(Scheve and Stasavage, 2006; Haggard et al., 2013). The ESS asks respondents: “Apart from 
special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious 
services nowadays?”. I classify those who state that they attend services at least once a week 
as religious (coded 1 in the dataset). Individuals who replied that they attend Church “once a 
month”, “only on special holy days”, “less often”, and “never” are defined as not religious 
(coded 0). 20 percent of the sample are classified as religious.5 
 
To evaluate hypotheses two and three, partisanship is measured using the party identification 
question from the ESS which asks: “Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than 
all the other parties?”. Respondents are then asked to name the party. To aid cross-national 
comparison, I code the responses into party families using the ParlGov Database (Döring and 
Manow, 2016) the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015) and data from the Manifesto 
Project (Volkens et al., 2017). I have added to these party families using Pop-Eleches’s (2010) 
concept of unorthodox parties which considers the specificity of the CEE party landscape. He 
identifies four types of unorthodox party: nationalist populists, centrist populists, extreme 
nationalists, and the radical left. Nationalist populists and extreme nationalists are 
distinguished by the latter’s more virulent rhetoric while the more populist policy platforms 
of the former have seen some become mainstream parties of government e.g. Fidesz in 






I include several controls in each model all of which are standard in studies of redistributive 
preferences. These are the demographic variables age and age squared to capture any non-
linearity in the effect of age, together with gender. An indicator of whether a respondent is 
presently, or has been, a trade union member is included along with a measure of 
respondents’ income (measured in deciles), employment status, education6 and occupation. 7 I 
also include two controls which may be expected to negate the effect of religiosity. First, the 
effect of religious denomination is assessed using a categorical indicator. Given the 
predominance of the Catholic Church in the countries in this sample, it is expected that 
Catholics will be more likely to favor redistribution than secular individuals. Second, domicile 
is an indicator of where individuals live with the expectation that individuals in more 
peripheral areas will be less prosperous. Individuals in rural areas are also more likely to be 
religious.  
 
Each model also contains three country-level controls which I have added to the dataset. The 
first is the Gini coefficient. Previous research has shown that demand for redistribution will 
be higher in countries where cross-sectional inequality is higher. The Gini coefficient is 
measured on a scale from 0 to 100 and is taken from the UN World Income Inequality 
Database (UNU-WIDER, 2017). Second, GDP per capita in current US dollars which controls 
for the level of economic development in each country is included in the model. GDP data is 
taken from the World Bank Databank.8  The final macrolevel variable is ethnic 
fractionalization, as formulated by Alesina et al. (2003) which is the likelihood that any two 
randomly selected individuals from a population belong to different ethnic groups. This is 
obtained from the Quality of Governance dataset (Teorell et al., 2013). Descriptive statistics 






The micro- and macro-level nature of the data and binary outcome of the dependent variable 
necessitates the use of a multilevel logit model. Although the number of groups is relatively 
low, a multilevel model is still able to provide reliable estimates of individual level effects 
(Gelman and Hill, 2007). Country level estimates when the number of groups is low may be 
unreliable but as the focus of this paper is not country level variables or cross-level 
interactions, a multilevel model is the appropriate estimation technique in this case (Bryan 
and Jenkins, 2016).9  For individual i in country j the following equation is estimated: 
 
 
Support for redistribution = α + β1Religiosityij + β2Party IDij 
+ β4Individual level controlsij 
 
+ β5Macro level controlsj + ε0j 
 
 
An interaction term, β6Religiosityij × Party IDj, is added to the model to test hypothesis three. 





The results of the models are displayed in Table 1. The first model assesses the effect of 
religiosity in the absence of interaction terms and the indicators of party identification. In this 
model, the coefficient for religiosity is both positive and statistically significant at the p=0.001 
level, indicating that religious individuals are more likely to prefer greater redistribution. 
Previous research based on established democracies shows that religiosity has the reverse 
effect: religious individuals oppose redistribution. That religiosity increases support for 
redistribution in CEE is evidence of a different relationship between religion and an 
individual’s economic preferences. In substantive terms, the probability of a religious 
individual favoring greater redistribution is 2.1 percent higher than that of non-religious 
respondents. To compare this to the effect of other variables in the model, individuals in the 
third income decile have a 2.4 percent greater probability of supporting redistribution than 
those in the fifth decile, an effect comparable to that of religiosity. Considered another way, 
the odds ratio for religiosity shows that religious individuals have 19 percent greater odds of 

























 (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
No religion (ref.)    
Roman Catholic 0.242** 0.273*** 0.278*** 
 (0.081) (0.066) (0.065) 
Protestant 0.031 0.039 0.052 
 (0.147) (0.137) (0.133) 
Eastern Orthodox 0.393 0.413 0.417 
 (0.319) (0.306) (0.304) 
Other 0.197* 0.176 0.193 
 (0.099) (0.105) (0.100) 
Big city (ref.)    
Suburbs 0.147 0.176** 0.177** 
 (0.080) (0.061) (0.061) 
Town 0.282*** 0.278*** 0.276*** 
 (0.053) (0.050) (0.049) 
Country village 0.337*** 0.319*** 0.319*** 
 (0.042) (0.038) (0.038) 
Countryside 0.260 0.243 0.239 
 (0.183) (0.182) (0.182) 
Social democrat  0.312*** 0.315*** 
  (0.055) (0.055) 
Liberal  -0.621*** -0.682*** 
  (0.086) (0.157) 
Conservative  -0.497 -0.470 
  (0.279) (0.298) 
Christian  democrat  -0.590*** -0.636*** 
  (0.010) (0.018) 
Nationalist  populist  0.263*** 0.123* 
  (0.046) (0.059) 
Centrist populist  -0.266 -0.251 
  (0.142) (0.143) 
Extreme right  -0.111 0.021 
  (0.346) (0.307) 
Radical left  0.495 0.784** 
  (0.388) (0.245) 
Religiosity × Soc. dems.   -0.005 
   (0.022) 
Religiosity × Liberal   0.133 
   (0.188) 
Religiosity × Cons.   -0.158 
Table continued on next page    
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  (0.273) 
Religiosity × Chris. dems.   0.117*** 
(0.025) 
Religiosity × Nats. pops.   0.234** 
(0.073) 
Religiosity × Cent. pops.   -0.147* 
(0.067) 
Religiosity × Ext. right   -0.593** 
(0.193) 
Religiosity × Rad. left   -0.910*** 
(0.218) 
Constant 0.657 -2.204 -2.008 









 (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) 
N 51958 51262 51262 
Countries 9 9 9 
Log-likelihood -13653.191 -13442.397 -13433.261 
AIC 27324.381 26900.794 26882.522 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Note: Each model also includes the following controls the results of 
which are not shown to reduce the size of the table: age, age2, gender, 
trade union membership, income, education, and the macrolevel 
variables ethnic fractionalization, log GDP, and the Gini coefficient. The 




To test the robustness of the relationship I included two controls in model one which may confound 
the effect of religiosity. Firstly, it may be expected that simply belonging to a faith — as opposed to 
frequently attending services — could be a better indicator of an individual’s welfare preferences. 
Secondly, it could be argued that individuals who live in more peripheral regions would be more likely 
to prefer redistribution as these areas tend to be economically disadvantaged. Model one shows that 
neither of these variables negates the effect of religiosity. The model shows that regardless of an 
individual’s devotion to their faith, followers of the Catholic Church are significantly more likely to 
support redistribution than secular individuals in Central and Eastern Europe. While some existing 
literature has suggested followers of the Catholic faith would be more likely to favor redistributive 
policies (Kahl, 2005), empirical research has found that this is not the case in advanced democracies 
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(Stegmueller et al., 2012). This result challenges existing knowledge however, it should be noted that 
Catholics comprise 46 percent of the sample while Protestants and followers of other faiths represent 
just 13 percent. One should therefore be cautious about interpreting this as evidence of a Catholic-
Protestant divide in attitudes towards redistribution. Instead, it is evidence of a religious-secular 
divide that works in the opposite direction to that found in advanced democracies, as secular 
individuals in CEE are more likely to hold less favorable attitudes towards redistribution than 
followers of the dominant faith in the countries in this sample. As expected, individuals that live in 
more peripheral regions — indicated in the table as towns, villages, and the countryside — are more 
likely to hold pro-redistribution policy preferences than big city dwellers. The fact that religiosity 
remains a significant indicator even after the addition of these potentially confounding variables 
suggests that this finding is robust, thus allowing me to confirm hypothesis one. 
 
Model two includes the indicator of party identification. As one may expect, individuals that identify 
with parties of the center (liberals) and mainstream right (Christian democrats and conservatives) are 
less likely to favor redistribution while supporters of social democrats and the radical left are more 
likely to favor redistribution. The probability of a liberal party identifier preferring redistribution is 75 
percent and at the other end of the scale, those that identify with the radical left have an 89 percent 
probability of favoring redistribution. This reinforces the point concerning the generally high level of 
support for redistribution in CEE. The only parties of which supporters are significantly more likely to 
favor redistribution are social democrats and nationalist populists. Supporters of both parties have an 
87 percent probability of preferring greater redistribution. Interestingly, those that identify with 
extreme right parties are less likely to support redistribution. This is likely to be a result of the 
primacy such parties place on issues relating to culture and the position of ethnic minority groups in 
certain countries such as Slovakia (Bustikova, 2014). These results provide qualified support for 
hypothesis two. Supporters of nationalist populist parties are more likely to prefer traditionally left-
wing redistributive policies which demonstrates evidence of partisan motivated reasoning. However, 
one argument of this paper is that religious individuals are motivated to support redistribution 
because of their partisan identification. If so, then religious supporters of nationalist populists should 
be more likely to favor redistribution than the religious supporters of other parties due to the 
22  
association of nationalism with religion and the welfare state. 
 
Model three shows the results of the interaction of religiosity with party identification. It shows that 
religiosity significantly increases support for redistribution among individuals that identify with Christian 
democratic and nationalist populist parties. Conversely, religious supporters of extreme right and 
radical left parties are less likely to favor redistribution. That the results for the extreme right and 
radical left are similar may appear surprising, however, in CEE, these party families share several 
traits and appeal to similar voters. The radical left in CEE are defined as much by their overt 
xenophobic nationalism as extreme right parties (Ishiyama, 2009). For both party families, issues 
associated with the nation-state rather than distribution are primary. It is therefore not surprising that 
individuals with extreme right attitudes can end up supporting radical left parties in some CEE 
countries; Ishyama (2009) has termed this the “red-brown impulse”. 
 





Figure 2 illustrates the results from model three, showing the marginal effect of religiosity on 
preferences for redistribution conditional on party identification. Religiosity significantly increases the 
probability that an individual will favor redistribution by 4.5 percent among supporters of Christian 
democrats and 4.1 percent among supporters of nationalist populists. However, it should be noted that 
the actual probability of religious individual favoring redistribution is lower among Christian 
democrat supporters at 78 percent compared to 89 percent for nationalist populist identifiers. The 4.1 
percent increased probability of favoring redistribution among religious supporters of nationalist 
populist parties is almost double the marginal effect of religiosity alone which is 2.1 percent based on 
results from model one. This provides support for hypothesis three: the effect of religiosity on support 
for redistribution is conditional on identification with nationalist populist parties which can credibly 
bundle together leftist economic policy positions and a traditional religious outlook. Therefore, left-
wing economic positions align with the partisan identities of religious individuals in CEE. 
 
 
The control variables largely conform to expectations based on previous research. The results for 
these are not shown in Table 1 but can be found in the full version of the table in the supplementary 
material (Table S2). Individuals with lower incomes and the unemployed are more likely to favor 
redistribution as they will be net beneficiaries of any redistributive policies (Meltzer and Richard, 
1981). It may also be the case that religious individuals are more likely to be from lower income 
groups. In Table S4, model one, of the supplementary material to this article I test this proposition by 
interacting income with religiosity. The results show that poorer religious individuals are less likely to 
support redistribution which is similar to the findings of Gaskins et al., (2013) however, the coefficient 
is not statistically significant. Therefore, in CEE, religious individuals right across the income 
distribution are more likely to support redistribution than non-religious individuals. Those who are at 
greater risk of income loss are also more likely to favor redistribution in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Low levels of education, which indicates that individuals have less marketable skills (Cusack et al., 
2006), and working in a low-status occupation are both significantly associated with support for 
redistribution in all models in Table 1. Similarly, trade union members are also more likely to favor 
redistribution as union membership is often an indicator that an individual perceives themselves, or 
their occupational sector, to be particularly vulnerable to unemployment (Cusack et al., 2006). Finally, 
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both older respondents and women are more likely to hold pro-redistribution policy preferences. 
 
Turning to the macrolevel variables, neither GDP nor the level of ethnic fractionalization are 
significant. However, the result for inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, does indicate that 
higher levels of inequality are significantly associated with greater individual-level support for 
redistribution as may be expected based on the Meltzer-Richard model (1981). The results of the 
control variables demonstrate the generalizability of many of the key theories of attitudes towards 
redistribution which further underscores the importance of the main findings of this research. The 
effect of religion on the demand for redistribution in CEE shows that existing explanations of the 
relationship are limited in some respects. The theory outlined in this research provides an explanation 
for the results observed in CEE but it is also applicable to advanced democracies and may supplement 





The results presented in Table 1 provide support for the central argument of this article. However, the 
question of the communist legacy hangs over any analysis of political behavior in CEE (Pop-Eleches 
and Tucker, 2017). Disentangling the communist legacy from other influences can be difficult. One way 
that it can be addressed in this research is by identifying a subset of post-communist countries where 
the welfare state was not used alongside religion to support the nation-building process. In such 
countries, right-wing populist parties will not be able to use both religion and redistributive appeals to 
define supporters’ partisan identities. The ESS contains data for both Russia and Ukraine where 
welfare expansion occurred much later compared to CEE and when both countries were part of the 
Soviet Union. The delayed onset of welfare expansion was due to the emphasis that was placed on 
rapid industrialization and defense in the Soviet Union between the 1930s and 1950s which consumed 
the vast proportion of state resources (Smith, 1988). Social policies, such as income support and pensions, 
were implemented with limited coverage from the 1930s but the expansion of these policies occurred as 
industrialization gathered pace from the 1960s onwards (McAuley, 2008). Therefore, there should not 
be the same association of religion with the welfare state in Russia and Ukraine that we find in CEE. 
Consequently, religiosity should not be associated with pro-redistributive economic preferences. 
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I test this by specifying separate logit models of religiosity and redistributive preferences for both 
Russia and Ukraine.10  The results are reported in Table 2. In both countries, religiosity is negatively 
associated with redistributive preferences, similar to Western Europe where welfare state expansion 
also occurred subsequent to the state-building process. The coefficients in these models are not 
significant but they do provide evidence of a different relationship between religiosity and 
redistributive preferences in former-Soviet countries compared to CEE countries. Most importantly, 
these results show that support for redistribution among religious individuals is not a legacy of 
communism. Instead, the evidence from Table 1 and Table 2 provides support for the central 
argument of this article. 
 
Table 2: Religion and preferences for redistribution 














 (0.091) (0.119) 
N 7797 4670 
Log-likelihood -18747.571 -3959.109 
AIC 37523.141 7944.218 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Note: Models contain the control variables age, age
2
, gender, trade union membership, income, and 
education. The full models including controls can be found in Table S7 of the online appendix 
 
 
The mechanism outlined in this research can also be tested by examining countries outside of CEE in 
which state-building was not directed against the church and where the welfare state was used as part 
of the state-building process. In most established democracies, state-building was completed long 
before the development of social protection policies. One potential exception may be Ireland where 
state-building and the establishment of initial welfare institutions occurred around the same time 
during the inter-war period. While the Catholic church was influential in the development of the Irish 
state, both the church and government were less concerned with social protection. Successive 
governments from 1923 were influenced by the austere economic principles of the founder of Sinn 
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Féin, Arthur Griffith (Powell, 2017). Limiting expansion of the state became a guiding principle under 
both Cumann na nGaedheal and Fianna Fáil governments (Kelly, 1999; Powell, 2017). Moreover, given 
the predominantly agricultural Irish economy, and the influence of rural interests in setting the 
political agenda, the state prioritized land redistribution, leading to what Norris (2016) terms a 
‘property-based welfare state’. The lack of a strong organized labour movement during this period also 
limited support for expansion of the state. Given these developmental differences with CEE, there is 
less reason to expect a strong relationship between religiosity and support for redistribution in 
Ireland. However, there is reason to believe that religious supporters of Fianna Fáil, the right-wing 
party which implemented most of Ireland’s welfare state policies, would be more likely to favour 
redistribution given the church’s relationship with the party during state-building.  
 
To test this, I ran two logit models using data from the ESS. The first model in Table S8 of the 
supplementary material shows that religious individuals in Ireland are more likely to support 
redistribution, but the coefficient is not statistically significant. Model two in the table contains an 
interaction term for religiosity and party identification. This shows that religious Fianna Fáil 
supporters are more likely to favour redistribution than non-religious supporters. These results 
provide partial support for the mechanism set out in this paper though, as noted, the specificities of 
Ireland’s state-building process mean that it is not directly comparable to CEE. 
 
Previous research has shown that in CEE, authoritarian attitudes are associated with left-wing 
economic orientations (De Regt et al., 2011). This is unsurprising given the legacy of communism 
which was both an authoritarian political system and highly redistributive economic system. 
Authoritarian values are also associated with religiosity (Schwartz, 2003). There is therefore the 
possibility that religiosity and support for the welfare state in CEE are, in fact, proxies for authoritarian 
values. Model two of Table S4 includes indicators of authoritarian values derived from the Schwartz 




Finally, some studies of redistributive preferences include an indicator of an individual’s ideological 
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orientation (Finseraas, 2009). I opted not to include left-right orientation in the main models as the 
variable suffers from a fairly high degree of item non-response – including ideology reduces the 
number of observations in this research by approximately 10,000. In Table S5 I specified models that 
include left-right orientation; the main results of this research remain unchanged. 
 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
The results of this research show that religiosity has a fundamentally different effect on preferences 
for redistribution in CEE compared to established democracies. In contrast to established democracies, 
religious individuals in CEE are more likely to favour state intervention to increase redistribution. This 
is a surprising result in the context of prior research which has shown that religion tends to induce 
individuals to oppose redistribution (Scheve and Stasavage, 2006, De La O and Rodden, 2008).  
 
In this research I have argued that the effect of religion on redistributive preferences can be explained 
by partisan motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990; Taber and Lodge, 2006). Religious individuals adopt 
redistributive positions that correspond with their partisan identities. In Western Europe, religious 
individuals generally support parties of the conservative right (Arzheimer and Carter, 2009) which are 
faced by well-established social democratic parties of the left. This leads religious individuals to 
oppose redistribution. But in CEE, nationalist populist parties draw support from religious individuals. 
These parties also adopt leftist economic positions and consequently, religious individuals in CEE are 
motivated to support greater redistribution. Because partisanship does not always override other 
beliefs and attributes (Mullinix, 2016; Slothuus, 2010), nationalist parties need to be able to credibly 
adopt left-wing economic positions so that these do not challenge the partisan identities of individuals. 
Parties are able to do so due to the dimensionality of party competition in CEE (Tavits and Letki, 2009) 
combined with the historic association of both religion and the welfare state with conceptions of 
nationalism in the region (Aidukaite, 2009; Cerami and Stanescu, 2009; Grzymala-Busse, 2015; Inglot, 
2008). 
 
Taken together, the results of this research demonstrate that the dominant theories of how religion 
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relates to redistributive preferences do not travel well to new democracies. In this article, I have 
offered an alternative explanation to argue that partisan motivated reasoning can influence how 
religious individuals form their preferences for redistribution. The results presented here support this 
argument. While the focus of this paper has been CEE, the theoretical framework is not specific to the 
region. Partisan motivated reasoning is likely to see religious individuals adopt redistributive 
preferences that align with the positions of their parties in both older and younger democracies. One 
question that remains is under what conditions it is possible that religious individuals in advanced 
democracies could support redistribution? Four conditions would need to be met: first, space for 
competition would need to open on the left of the economic policy dimension. Second, religious 
individuals would have to shift from their current alignment with conservative parties. Third, an 
alternative party standing on a redistributive platform would need to appeal to religious individuals. 
Fourth, this alternative party would need to be able to credibly justify its redistributive platform to 
religious voters. We are perhaps seeing some of these conditions emerge in Western Europe. Social 
democratic parties are in electoral decline, thus creating space for competition on the left of the 
economic policy dimension. Furthermore, radical right-wing parties are shifting their previously pro-
market economic platforms to combine elements of pro-welfare policies with traditionalist values (Afonso 
and Rennwald, 2018), though the credibility of that shift remains a matter for debate. However, for 
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